State of the Art & Theoretical Framework
WP4, Identity

Shaping Alternative Identities in Southeast Asia: Youth, Violence, and Transnationalism

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I. FRAMEWORK AND OBJECTIVES

Southeast Asia is home to multiple ethnic and religious identities, which – through historical processes dating to colonial and pre-colonial times – have shaped the differing types of nationalism of individual modern nation-states. Local loyalties were shaped by their inclusion in broader systems of belief such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam and other religious or ideological frameworks. These frameworks have been both transnational, and national, and often a combination of both (McCaskill et al. 2008). It can be argued that these identities underpin Southeast Asian citizens' sense of their membership of a putative ASEAN Community. In recent years, ASEAN as a regional organization, has paid particular attention to the shaping of new forms of collective imaginations about the future of the region. These have committed the Association to going in directions that reach beyond the politico-economic realm per se, based on a growing awareness of the interrelatedness of the region’s diverse cultures.

However, these initiatives remain elite-driven. The peoples of Southeast Asia have not yet developed a common identity, comparable to that found among Europeans, and one based on a robust belief in the regional integration project. The current global context places pressure on the values of multilateralism and the possibility of plural and transversal identities, and poses a threat to ASEAN’s framework-building efforts in the socio-cultural sphere. There is a risk that they could be displaced by more exclusive visions, whether they be national, religious or ethnic in character. In any case, Southeast Asian identity should not be confused, as a conceptual tool, with the identity of ASEAN as a regional organisation (Acharya 2000). The identity of Southeast Asians may be seen as an arena for the interplay of different forces competing for the allegiances of the inhabitants.

Work Package 4 will examine three issues over which these forces compete and are, we believe, the key to the future of an emerging SEA identity: generations, transnationalism, and violence. Generational configurations are the focus of a study on the national, ethnic, religious and regional identities of SEA youth and the motivation of young women and men to seek a role shaping the future idea of ASEAN (Thompson & Chulanee 1996). Transnational ethno-religious groups, possessing a capacity both to imagine solidarity and also to exacerbate tensions, are studied for their potential to support or contested regional integration (Hirsch 1996). Furthermore, for collective futures to nurture loyalty, collective pasts must be settled and ways found for people to come to terms with memories of inter-communal violence. This has a contemporary dimension as well as extremism still competes to posit itself as a legitimate influence on identity construction.

As a transversal theme we study multiple mobilities, notably mobile populations (labour migrants, pilgrims, tourists, refugees) to discern if their movements compete with, or legitimise, forms of Southeast Asian identity. Another transversal theme stems from the recognition of the importance of security for regional solidarity, conceived in several different respects, including human security from violence and social exclusion. As we explore identity construction, gender is another traversal theme that informs our analysis. Religious resurgence has taken various
forms among Muslim men and women, ranging from pious feminism to radical patriarchy, while similar contestations engage Buddhist monks and nuns, and Buddhist societies and moralities at large. Repression of the LGBT community in Indonesia would seem to indicate that a general fluidity in gender definition is now reverting to a morally grounded heteronormativity.

ASEAN as a regional entity shapes collective imaginings about the future of the region. These visions rest on the three pillars that support a community ideal: economy, security, and culture. As the violent polarisations of the Cold War give way to post-conflict mobilities of people and information, Southeast Asia’s population is becoming culturally aware of its own creative diversity, its place in Asia and the world. Local and global forces clamour for its attention and loyalty, forging new multiple identities of a wider regional belonging. But as these are undermined by the crisis of globalisation, the embrace and celebration of difference – at the heart of regional integration – risks being subsumed in nationally and culturally conferred forms of legitimacy.

The struggle for legitimacy of non-state actors is relevant in two ways. At one level, it shows that within traditional markers such as ethnicity, religion, and generation, movements are looking for legitimate ways of self-definition. At another level, it demonstrates how such markers bring together actors around Southeast Asia (Hau & Kasian 2011). In so doing, they contribute to a re-imagining of the region’s future. This is a search for legitimacy that responds to issues that confront the region as a whole.

Researchers in Work Package 4 recognise that ASEAN-led integration proceeds largely as an agreement among member states to facilitate the exchange of goods, services, and people and enhance the quality of the region’s competitive relations. In this light, many processes involved in forging regional belonging are led by member states. But we also acknowledge that other ways of creating partnerships and communities are possible and, at the present time, are perhaps more relevant to the region’s future than ever before. Thus WP 4 approaches the forging of regional belonging from the perspective and experiences of non-state entities.

ASEAN as a region also relies on networks built by its citizens based on ethnic, religious, and generational affinities. Our research reflects this reality, and seeks to investigate ethnic, religious, and generational responses across the region. The areas we examine include violence and trauma (Timor-Leste, Myanmar; Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam), climate change (Malaysia), exclusion (Vietnam, Myanmar), and mobility (the Philippines). In our view, these are issues that, ostensibly at least, would compel the peoples of Southeast Asia to respond in a collective fashion. Taken together, the individual research projects in our Work Package all question to what extent non-state actors are taking part in shaping, or contesting, regional integration. At the same time, their initiatives demonstrate both the potential and limits of regional integration. Taking note of CRISEA’s transversal themes, a particular strength of our work is the conscious attempt we make at providing gendered perspectives on these issues, and at studying regional connections (religious networks, generational configurations), transnational identities (Rohingya, Tai), and the impact of violence (Cambodia, East Timor; Vietnam, and Myanmar).
2. GENERATIONS
(MEDELINA K. HENDYTIO AND VIDHYANDIKA D. PERKASA)

Introduction

The aim of this section is to present the state of the art on the concept of generations in relation to identity. Scholars note that different generations construct their own identity, which is influenced by certain settings, experience, or events whether it be economic, socio-political, or cultural. Identity construction within a specific generation is also trans-boundary. It involves people’s adaptation and acculturation into a specific locus or boundary. We will also explore the meaning of ‘generations’ and how ‘generation’ and ‘identity’ have been conceptualized in the literature. We also seek to understand what dimensions, or factors, determine the construction of identity within a particular generation. There is a significant literature discuss generations and identity separately, yet a literature that combines an examination of both together is still in an embryonic stage.

To ask how generations can shape the identity of ASEAN is a question about the future. We focus on how younger generations are shaping collective imaginings about ASEAN identity. Can the younger generations help forge a harmonious identity for the peoples of ASEAN? Compared to their predecessors, the younger generations have different expectations of ASEAN. This is the overall underpinning of our Work Package’s interest in the generational question. According to a study by the Philippine Institute of Development Studies, Southeast Asian Millennials (15–20 years old by c. 2011) are moderately familiar with, or aware of, ASEAN as an identity-forming regional factor. This is in contrast to a significantly higher awareness among respondents aged 50 and above. The same survey shows that the emotional attachment to being an ‘ASEAN citizen’ increased with the age of the respondents. These research results appear paradoxical, as one might expect a greater attachment to ASEAN by members of a generation like the Millennials who have grown up with ASEAN since the days of their birth. Crucial to understanding how they imagine the future are the aspirations of Millennials about ASEAN and its roles and functions some 50 years after it was established. When the word ‘identity’ is incorporated with that of ‘generation’, it suggests questions such as: Who are we? Where do we come from? What shared experiences do we have? Where are we going? And what moves us?

The process of answering such questions is a process of constructing identity both individually and collectively within a specified age cohort and in a particular era or time. In the ASEAN context, generation theory will be utilized to address questions about who the millennials are, how millennial generations perceive ASEAN identity, and what their roles are in the future. It is also salient to understand their outlook for the future and whether they are fearful of, or embracing of, globalization as well as their sense of identity within the region. For example, the younger generations may not take into account the historical factors underlying ASEAN creation: for ASEAN founders the Association was to be a vehicle for developing a
sence of Southeast Asian identity and building a sense of regional awareness. Yet the keywords of generations are succession, renewal, and the engendering of new life (Willer 2011).

**On generations and shared experiences**

Generational identity is defined as an individual's awareness of his or her membership in a generational group and the significance of this group to the individual himself (Joshi, Dencker, Franz, & Martocchio 2010). On observing behaviour in the workplace Tolbize (2008) argued that a generation is "an identifiable group that shares birth years, age, location, and significant life events at critical developmental stages". This in line with Mannheim's (cited in Kertzer 1983) definition that generation is about sharing a common outlook on the basis of its members' common experience and excluding those who did not. In that sense, the use of the term 'generation' is meant to characterize the people living in a particular historical period. Put differently, generations are not so much defined by their age brackets, as they are by shared experiences.

Thus, the concept of generations is not an abstract idea but one based on shared economic, historical, social, political, and cultural experiences. Identity formation is consequently rooted in such defining moments. In other words, specific events shape the identity of specific generations. Researchers thus take note of shifts in society in the form of demographic transitions, democratization, social conflicts, or violence. These factors can foster new social conditions in which specific generations are growing up. Different formative experiences when they interact with the life-cycle and aging process could shape people's views of the world (Wyn & Cahill 2015).

Why do these moments matter? Mannheim (quoted in Kertzer 1983) claims that political and economic struggle have the potential to affect an individual's consciousness leading to the search for a new identity. For example, a generation which experienced violence tends to shape its identity in a particular way such as by contesting a more collective national identity and forming a more secluded or primordial identity. In this regard, violence or trauma is a potent generational marker. Several studies argue this point. For example, the conflict in the Maluku Islands in Indonesia gives a clear picture of how generations, identity, nationalism, and violence relate to one other: Bjorkhagen's (2013) research on the conflict in the Moluccas in the early 2000s suggest this very point. For youth, many of whom were under 18 then, the conflict in the Moluccas was the result of resentment among the Muslims towards a legacy of Dutch colonial rule that favoured only Christians. Thus, when conflict erupted in 1999, violence led to segregation along religious lines. In this context, identity formation has been linked to religion. The nation-wide popular uprising against military dictatorship in Myanmar (Burma), with key events occurring on 8 August 1988, gave rise to a generation of students, young monks, civil servants and workers whose political worldview was very much shaped by decades of fighting for democracy and the restoration of civilian rule. This was the moment at which the Burmese "8888 generation", now in their late 40s and early 50s, came into being (Maung Maung 1999). Further to the east, in Thailand, the collective experiences of persons born in the 1950s were
very much shaped by the struggle of the 1970s for democracy and against military domination culminating in the uprising of 14 October 1973. Members of that “October Generation” joined hands in the pro-democracy movement of 1992 and also led the street protests of 2006–2014 both on the sides of the “yellow shirts” (conservative monarchical) and the “red shirts” (progressive) movements (Kanokrat 2012).

Transnationalism, such as that engendered by migration, contributes as well to the formation of identity among generations. This can be seen in the Papuan case where indigenous Papuans who have been living in Indonesia for many years have suffered economic, political and cultural discrimination exacerbated by human rights violations. Due to such treatment, they only reluctantly identify themselves as ‘Indonesian’ and have sought independence from the Indonesian nation state. Yet, since the early 1960s they are struggling to establish a Papuan nationalism, i.e. a form of exclusive identity.

Toblize (2008) has observed that a generation’s value system or characteristics could be generated through interaction among its members. Members of a generation share common experiences that influence their thoughts, values, behaviour, and reactions. Over time this would create the specific characteristics of a unique generational group. For Toblize, individuals bring with them “personalities, influences, and particular backgrounds from their race, class, gender, region, family, religion and more. Yet, some broad generalizations are possible among those who are born in approximately the same years. For example, values tend to be similar among members within each generation.” (Toblize 2008: 1)

The fact that social factors shape identity indicates that it is fluid, and can be changed, in so far as it involves people’s adaptation to different social contexts (Dimock 2018). Cornelio (2015) and Anagnost et al (2013) argue that political participation, social engagement, and religiosity are also elements that form new identities. By taking the case of Salafi followers in Indonesia, Cornelio has shown that religiosity could impinge upon young people’s new identity formation. He quotes Hasan’s study on the Drama of Jihad: The Emergence of Salafi Youth in Indonesia (2010) which demonstrates that Salafism is an alternative channel for youth to find their identity and establish their place in an Indonesian society whose modernization has left them alienated, an alienation exacerbated by poverty and unemployment. By wearing the prescribed dress (jalabiyya and turban), growing a beard, and praying and reciting the Quran with the right accent youth can internalize a “total Muslim” identity. These phenomena suggest that according to Dimock (2018), identity formation within a specific generation is also trans-boundary. This means that, regardless of their country or community of birth, when faced with similar issues across national borders, impacted on by the same events and sharing similar experiences, people of the same age are likely to have similar underlying value systems. These “value systems” inform behaviour and attitudes.

Nevertheless, it could be asked what factors account for different value systems among different generations? The work of Neil Howe and William Strauss (2007) on generational theory postulates that different generations develop different value systems. A similar view can be found in the studies of Taylor (2010) who argues that each generation has aspirations which...
are necessarily different from those of other generations. A crucial factor, amongst others, that influences value systems is the personal experience shared with numerous other members of the same generation. Confirming our identification of the importance of this factor, Mannheim’s research (quoted in Kertzer 1983) shows that the different value systems of each generation could be driven by their unique experiences.

A similar observation was made by Crodington (2008), who found that historical context also plays an important role in shaping a generation’s value system. This can be seen from the fact that individuals who belong to the same generation – and with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process – could form a generational consciousness. As Taylor (2010) observes, life experiences, such as war or economic crisis, have an impact on how a generation defines itself. The experiences of the generations of the Depression Era, World War II, and the Cold War period reflect the link between specific situations in the past with certain characteristics attached to generational identity later. Most Southeast Asian countries went through such generational experiences in the last sixty years, for example the wars in Vietnam and Laos in the 1960s and early 1970s or the 1965 massacres in Indonesia. Such traumatic experiences of one generation could even impact on the psychological makeup of their children’s generation (Herman 1992).

Based on the discussion above, the scientific literature identifies several distinct contemporary generations. Policy Solutions and FEPS (2016), for example, categorize generations into the following: Generation Z (also known as iGeneration or Post-Millennials, born 1996 and later); Millennials (or Generation Y, born 1977 to 1995); Generation X (born 1965 to 1976); Baby Boomers (born 1946 to 1964); and the Traditionalists or Silent Generation (born 1945 and earlier). For Pew Research, those people born between 1981 and 1996 (ages 22–37 in 2018) are considered as being Millennials, and anyone born from 1997 onward is part of the new Generation Z. Generation X (born between 1965 and 1980) and the Baby Boomers who were born between 1946 and 1964. However, it should be born in mind that these generational classifications are global ones and they need modifications when applied to individual regions or countries. Moreover, there are, of course, discrepancies. The working definition of Millennials is equivalent with regard to the age span with that of their preceding generation, Generation X (born between 1965 and 1980). But, by this definition, both have a shorter time span than that, for example, of the Baby Boomers (19–20 years). The above categorizations indicate different cut off points and therefore each category has a different range. Age-based categorizations should only be viewed as tools and their boundaries are not arbitrary.

**On Millennials**

As suggested above, although there is no agreement on definitive age brackets by which Millennials are to be defined, Dimock (2018), for analytical purposes, uses 1996 as a meaningful cut off year between Millennials and post-Millennials. He notes that most Millennials were between the ages of 5 and 20 when the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 shook the American nation and in most other countries of the globe. He goes further by connecting age
with that important event in so far as many of Millennials at that time were old enough to comprehend the historical significance of that moment. On the contrary, most post-Millennials have little or no memory of the event. Dimock also refers to political participation by saying that most Millennials were between 12 and 27 during the 2008 US Presidential Election, during which the force of the youth vote became part of the political conversation, and helped elect the first black president in the US.

Millennials have also been identified as the generation that grew up after the Cold War and in the new era of globalization, communication technology, and wireless connectivity. They are living in an age of unprecedented diversity and exposure to other cultures. They are growing up too quickly and are confident – perhaps even arrogant – because this generation is mostly protected. Eric Chester (2002) in ‘Employing Generation Why?’ writes that the Millennials have, more than any other young generation, an ability to ‘filter out every command, every request and every instruction that is not bundled with acceptable rationale - they demand reasons and rationale’ (Chester 2002: 4)

The Deloitte Millennial Survey 2017 also seeks to capture some characteristics of the Millennial generation. According to this survey, Millennials are optimistic but are concerned about issues that directly impact on the individual, or which create an atmosphere of threat and uncertainty such as conflict, climate change, and scarcity. This survey also indicates that Millennials are a happy generation. Concerning aspirations, one salient finding by a survey by FEPS (2016) was that Millennials feel that politicians are out of touch in terms of issues and the way they approach young people, but that they still believe in politics as a way of bringing about change so that they can achieve their priorities. However, given their lack of confidence in politicians they do not want to join mainstream political parties, but would rather participate in advocacy groups and social movements, using their peer pressure to bring about a social transformation.

**Research within the generation research cluster**

This cluster involves the theme of generations as a crucial social configuration affecting how identities within ASEAN member countries are forged. Most ASEAN members are developing countries and, as a consequence, they have young populations. In economic terms, the youthful population is framed as a potent resource for regional integration and development, especially through the participation in the work force of those who are highly educated, mobile, and skilled. As discussed above transnationalism and identity are intimately connected in the scientific literature but in essentially national contexts. Researchers in Work Package 4 advance scholarship by giving attention instead to what young people in fact think about ASEAN as a regional entity. It has been noted above that familiarity with ASEAN among the younger generations is weaker than it is among the older ones. What are the attitudes of the younger generation toward the region? And what aspirations do they have for it? These are just some of the questions that the following projects seek to answer. Medelina K. Hendyto and Vidhyandika D. Perkesa analyse the Millennial Generation’s attitude towards ASEAN in various Southeast
Asian countries. They seek to do so from a comparative perspective, in order to appreciate its relevance for the emergence of an ASEAN regional identity.

Natasha Pairaudeau explores the past and present experiences of ethnic Shan migrants who were long-standing caravan traders in the Thai-Lao border area, and took up work in the gem mines in the Chantaburi region of Thailand. Her research looks at the factors which led to their group identity being subsequently weakened by decolonisation and nation-building, and will examine the violence which accompanied these processes. Oliver Tappe studies Vietnamese labour migration to neighbouring Laos spanning several generations which share common experiences of precarity, mobility, hope, and resilience. Finally, Viola Timm will investigate how consuming practices transform pilgrimage and how these corresponding practices are negotiated in a religious and gender-specific way. Muslim pilgrimages from the Middle East to Malaysia and vice versa will be analysed within the broader contexts of temporal transformation of the concepts of travelling by Muslims in Malaysia and will seek, thereby, to take generational shifts of Muslim pilgrimage into account.

3. TRANSNATIONALISM
(JAYEEL CORNELIO)

This section will cover the state of the art concerning transnationalism and identity in Southeast Asia. We connect these two concepts given Work Package 4’s interest in the role of non-state actors in shaping Southeast Asian identities. Identity construction may draw from religion, gender, ethnicity, and other social markers that bring together different people. Advocacy is also crucial in this regard. Different individual research projects under the theme of transnationalism investigate to what extent ordinary citizens and their respective organizations offer alternative pathways to articulating identity in the region. In doing so we seek to adopt what the literature describes as the transnational optic to examine “the boundaries and borders that emerge at particular historical moments” and explore “their relationship to unbounded arenas and processes” (Khagram & Levitt 2008, 5).

**Privileging non-state actors**

The literature on transnationalism privileges non-state actors to show that ties are forged not only by governments, but by other social forces. These non-state actors range from migrant workers and missionaries to multinational corporations and the media. Collectively they make transnationalism possible. By transnationalism is meant the “multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states” (Vertovec 1999: 447). This broad approach to transnationalism embraces different kinds of collaboration that have to do with advocacy groups, movements, mobility, and political action. They have potential contributions to institutionalizing legal norms and diffusing cultural values in the wider public (Kearney 1995). A narrower approach to transnationalism, by contrast, focuses only on identifiable and
purposeful “coalitions and actors” who attempt to “achieve specific political goals in the ‘target’ state of their activities” (Risse-Kappen 2008: 461). As opposed to the broad approach, the analytical advantage of this restrictive definition is in clearly identifying the policy impact of transnational activities.

Regardless of the approach, transnational studies show that identity is often an organic basis of these ties and coalitions. Put differently, transnational interactions revolve around identity, either by drawing from existing ones or creating new expressions. For example, identity is very much reflected in the religious, linguistic, and ethnic affinities of diasporic people. Such affinities are shared by these individuals even if they may be globally dispersed. In this sense the transnational identity is not only a social formation but also a type of consciousness. This consciousness, however, is not only oriented in one direction. Migrants may have emotional connections to both their home country and the place where they currently reside. Cultural practices may also reflect a transnational identity in terms of people’s everyday choices over fashion, music, and language. These cultural influences are made readily available by transnational platforms such as migration and the media. Identity is clearly a major area in transnational studies.

Why is the transnational angle important in studying regional integration? In our view, this angle is a conceptual and empirical corrective to nuance appreciations of regional integration as a state-led process. Often the process is driven by concerns for security and prosperity. In the first place, the region’s modern configuration is a result of strategic thinking after World War II (Osborne 2016). In the late 1990s ASEAN also articulated its vision of regional integration and prosperity based on a “common regional identity”. What that identity constitutes, however, remains contested (Jones 2004). What is clear, though, is that ASEAN, which presents itself as the official representation of the region, is typically seen as a regional bloc for trade and security. As the succeeding sections show, this narrative has generally gained traction among the peoples of Southeast Asia. But at the same time, other regional identities are being articulated which owe much to the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of the region. In some ways the pervasiveness of this diversity precedes and, in the contemporary period, challenges existing state boundaries (Ooi & Grabowsky 2017). The challenge lies in the fact that, on the one hand, these identities rely on transnational networks and, on the other, that they are shored up to respond to risks and other social problems in the region.

Put differently, these identities become the bases of “transnational ‘community ties’” (Beck 2008: 227). Sometimes they rely on organic “family resemblances” among beliefs and practices (Antweiler 2017: 74). But at other times they are deployed for strategic purposes. The point is that privileging non-state actors in these transnational connections sheds light on alternative regionalisms at work (Rother & Piper 2015). A short caveat is required here: the writings cited in this state of the art paper cover recent developments. But transnational linkages in the region are much older, as in the case of the spread of nationalism in the wake of anti-colonial movements and also the different waves of student activism in Southeast Asia (Hau & Tejapira 2011; Weiss et al. 2012).
Southeast Asian/ASEAN identity

There is no denying that the strength of ASEAN as a regional entity has been to foster peace and prosperity among its member states. This is in spite of its weak responses to some current regional issues such as the maritime disputes in South China Sea and the Rohingya crisis. But ASEAN is perceived as an elite gathering of decision-makers in the government and the business sector. Journalists have thus observed that “there appears to be limited public awareness of why ASEAN matters” (Hussain 2017). At the same time a sense of regional citizenship among its people is lacking which is why the “one identity” and “one community” ambition it aspires to remains elusive. If ever such a community exists, it does so only among the region’s policy elites who gather on a regular basis, as Murti (2016) critically argues. It is the policy elites who are aware of the norms that govern intraregional relations such as non-use of force in settling disputes, non-interference in members’ internal matters, and decision-making by consensus.

The last point is important to make even if a conceptual distinction were made between ASEAN identity and Southeast Asian identity. The scientific literature makes the case that the two are very much conflated as far as both the organization and the public are concerned. Acharya (2017, 29) notes, for example, that “the very idea of Southeast Asia as a region in itself, distinct from China and India, has much to do with the role of ASEAN”. This is in spite of the fact that Southeast Asian identities have their own histories, which have emerged based on ethnic, linguistic, and religious affinities (Osborne 2016). It is crucial to recognize this tension particularly because these affinities predate the formation of territorially bounded nation-states. For example, Kwanchewan Buadaeng’s (2013) work on the Talaku movement on the Thai-Burma borderland demonstrates the tensions generated by the state’s interventions to form its modern citizens.

How did this conflation between the geographical category and the formal region occur? One factor is the very history of ASEAN itself. The regional organization was founded in the spirit of securing peace and prosperity for its member states that had emerged in the postcolonial period with strong nationalist and developmentalist aspirations. Thus, for ASEAN’s founders the regional identity that was thus framed was not so much cultural as it was economic, thus developmentally oriented while not impinging on nationalist sentiments. It was only much later that the idea of ASEAN as also a cultural community came to be articulated by the organization (ASEAN 2016). According to the ASEAN Charter adopted a decade ago, “One Southeast Asia” is a community with a diversity of cultures and heritages. The Association, as a regional entity, seeks to foster greater awareness of this diversity (Acharya 2017).

Fostering this awareness, nevertheless, remains a challenge. A recent study shows that citizens in different sectors of the population are more familiar with the ASEAN’s economic pillar, than they are with its other pillars related to security and culture (Intal et al. 2017). That it remains an economic institution in the public’s mind feeds back into the perception that ASEAN is elitist. In this light expert recommendations on forging a regional identity have been generally targeted at promoting ASEAN as its embodiment. It has been proposed that
there should be “dialogue by engaging the diverse communities … by establishing their rights and responsibilities, giving voice to their concerns, activating their potential, and affirming the opportunity to be engaged as citizens of a dynamic region” (Jones 2004: 149).

The perception that ASEAN integration is elitist provides the background to Work Package 4’s interest in the role of transnational non-state actors in fostering alternative regional identities. More specifically, the contemporary interest in alternative regionalism in which “non-state actors such as domestic firms, transnational corporations, NGOs, and other types of social networks and social movements” (Igarashi 2011: 4) are involved, provides a springboard for our research. For this is the kind of regional integration that takes place from below. The succeeding sections spell out how this point has been argued in the literature by examining three themes: active transnational engagements for raising ASEAN awareness; transnational constructions based on shared identities; and critical approaches.

**Active transnational engagements for regional awareness**

The first theme concerns transnational initiatives that foster regional awareness in Southeast Asia. One important sector in this regard is education. In the past decades, a number of initiatives have been undertaken in order to create opportunities for students from different countries to interact with one another. Established in 1995, the ASEAN University Network (AUN) is an example. Although spearheaded by the ASEAN, it relies on collaboration among its member universities from around the region. Apart from working to enhance quality among its member universities, AUN is also driving student mobility. This attempt is crucial so that students in the region are exposed to different cultures and academic environments. Other initiatives have also been introduced such as innovative classes that promote ASEAN awareness. One program is the link created between two universities in Indonesia and Malaysia so their respective students could interact online (Azmwati & Quayle 2017). In spite of technological difficulties, their Skype sessions proved successful in encouraging dialogue among their students. This is a very good example of transnational learning.

How successful has the education sector been in raising regional awareness? A practical caveat clearly exists in that the quality and the viability of the education system is very uneven across Southeast Asia (Chao 2016). The unevenness poses a challenge to regional initiatives to integrate universities, to develop human capacity and to foster intercultural interactions among their students. It is not surprising therefore that the intervention described above is not commonplace. In fact, other studies show that the scale of other initiatives in the wider region is still low (Hou et al. 2017).

Nevertheless, some studies suggest that regional awareness exists. One example is the landmark study on young people’s familiarity with the ASEAN (Thompson et al. 2016). When university students in the region’s ten countries were asked to describe ASEAN, they used words that related to both regionalism and culture. For the students, the region was about cooperation, development, and poverty reduction. But it was also about transcending cultural diversity: 82% of the respondents feel that they are citizens of ASEAN. Yet, the important
point about this study is that the awareness of the region is tied to perceiving ASEAN as an economic community. Even recommendations to heighten awareness are still framed in terms of what the Association does to address development challenges in the region. They thus are aimed at correcting the elitist impression the public has of ASEAN.

**Transnational coalitions based on shared identities**

The second strand in the literature on transnationalism and identity has to do with the transnational networks of civil society actors. These actors, who are brought together by their shared identities and advocacies, are involved in what the literature calls an alternative form of regionalism, or integration that takes place from below. Although they are not the main policymakers, their presence has been notable. In fact one author has argued that regionalization is “progressing rapidly on the basis of actions undertaken by those involved in the civil society” (Igarashi 2011: 8). Other scholars have observed this reality in Southeast Asia by examining its particular characteristics. In the region, many civil society organizations have active partnerships with ASEAN itself. Some notable civil society organizations are the ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) and the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). To these can be added the ASEAN People’s Forum and the ASEAN Youth Forum. These are civil society organizations affiliated with ASEAN. Such partnerships exemplify a model adopted in Southeast Asia that is aimed at transforming perceptions of ASEAN as limited to an elite group of policymakers. At the same time these partnerships are strategic for transnational civil society in making their voices heard at the level of the region, for otherwise they are neglected at the level of some member states. These alternative spaces are valuable for members of the political opposition or marginalized groups.

However, according to Rother (2015), the caveat is that they have to strike a careful balance between their roles as partners of government and as advocacy groups. On the one hand, they may be seen as being merely co-opted entities. But, on the other, they have demands as outsiders that could make them lose their access to ASEAN or government agencies. At the same time, there are some concerns about the power of ASEAN to vet accredited civil society organizations. It is instructive to refer to the list of accredited organizations, which includes the ASEAN Federation of Accountants, the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners’ Association, and even the ASEAN Kite Council. None, however, is concerned with human rights subjects, which are sensitive issues for the different state actors in the region (ASEAN 2015).

It is for this reason that there is a need for other studies that focus on non-affiliated civil society organizations. Many of these organizations and networks are transnational in character, based on shared identities or advocacies about specific problems like human rights violations. Student activism, based on a common educational experience, is one area where a shared identity is at play. Although the extent of transnational linkages has varied over the years, there have been several waves of student activism contesting authoritarian and corrupt developmentalist regimes in Southeast Asia over the years (Weiss et al., 2012). Other types of advocacies have also been consolidated based on other shared identities such as those
pertaining to religion, ethnicity, and citizenship. The fact that they are not accredited at the formal ASEAN level makes their advocacy work at times difficult. But this non-recognition also provides an opportunity for them to exercise their agency in different ways. Indeed, agency is critical to respond creatively to various issues.

Migrant workers, for example, in spite of their being drawn from different nationalities, have ongoing interactions in the region in order to organize themselves. Two influential networks are the Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA) and Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility (CARAM Asia) (Rother and Piper 2015). Another transnational case is explored in Leider’s (2017) work on the Rohingya movement. This study identifies several transnational coalitions monitoring human rights issues in Myanmar. One coalition is the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN), which documents human rights abuses against Muslims in Rakhine State. Another recent study demonstrating agency is that by Baird (2015: 56) on the multiple transnational affiliations of indigenous groups in Laos. In fact, instead of transnational networks, he uses “translocal assemblages” to refer to the different regional affiliations that are helping ethnic groups in Laos to internalize their indigenous identity (Baird 2015, 56). In contrast to other countries in Southeast Asia, Laos has not adopted the term “indigenous people” as a legal category. This has had some consequences on the weak social protection of their marginalized communities in Laos itself. But, by being connected to advocacy groups such as the Indigenous Knowledge and Peoples Network (based in Chiang Mai), the Co-Management Learning Network (based on Phnom Penh), and the Asian Indigenous Peoples’ Pact (also based in Chiang Mai), local ethnic groups and their representatives have participated in activities around the region. In such interactions they learn about minority rights and environmental management.

**Critical approaches to transnationalism and identity**

The third approach to transnationalism and identity in Southeast Asia is critical. Studies using this approach are critical, insofar as they call into question the coherent and cohesive narrative of ASEAN. In the previous section the transnational coalitions discussed (whether ASEAN-affiliated or not) in one way or another provide support to the Association. In this section, by contrast, the social configurations discussed challenge the narrative of ASEAN as a formal regional bloc. These social configurations may either be formal (institutional) or informal (cultural). Whether the way they challenge ASEAN is explicit or otherwise, the point is that these cases illustrate ways in which identity and integration are critically engendered from below.

One strand of the scholarship on these social configurations is derived from anthropology and the humanities. These studies exemplify the broad approach to transnationalism that examines the diffusion of cultural values, practices, and norms. Unlike the examples highlighted in the discussions above, they show that regional identity is not so much reliant on organized entities, as it is on less formal arrangements brought about by migration and the media. In so doing the regional identity engendered is more fluid both in terms of its character, and also
its and social boundedness. The argument is that cultural experiences are alternative ways of thinking about regional identity by critiquing the state of affairs in the region. Cinema, which has a long history in Southeast Asia, is instructive in this regard (Ainslie 2016). Films are transnational, not only because of their circulation in the region, but by their nature. Contemporary studies on Southeast Asian cinema demonstrate how it is a “mass cultural medium of local and translocal relevance” (Fuhrmann 2017: 252). Some of the more important movies can be analysed in order to ascertain how they depict the region’s present by using images from the past. Although they draw from different materials, these case studies exemplify how these movies offer critiques of some regional developments in areas such as urbanization, migration, and the rise of the middle-class that has disenfranchised rural dwellers. Horror films in the region, which often reference local spirits, are interpreted in this manner (Ainslie 2016; see also Bräunlein & Lauser 2016). Indeed, anthropological work on spirits, and references to them, provides another type material to rethink Southeast Asian identity. Endres and Lauser (2011: 6) make the case that Southeast Asia is a “spiritscape” in which “transworldly, transreligious, and transethnic beings” operate. By this they mean that the spirits that affect everyday life and worship among locals move through the porous boundaries of the natural and the metaphysical worlds, religions and ethnicities, and the past and the present. The nature of these spirits is also diverse, ancestors, traditional deities, and even vengeful beings.

Other studies in the region show that the transnational encounter is a nexus of social, political, and economic power. This means that people and institutions, depending on their physical and social locations, will have different experiences of the transnational. In some cases it affords them greater choices while in others it limits their possibilities. This is why Hannerz (2008: 248) notes that in the transnational realm, there are different kinds of “kinship, friendship, collegiality, business, pursuits of pleasure, or struggles for security” that may either take a “peripheral or a central part”. For instance, the variegated experiences of transnational migrants are endowed with both possibilities and limits. For example, migrants in diasporic networks have been described as reclaiming their ethnic identities. Ethnic communities like the Tai Lue, who were dispersed in the wake of World War II and the Cultural Revolution, are rediscovering, not just their religious heritage, but also economic benefits too through cross-border movements in the Upper Mekong valley. As a result, even its ancient manuscript culture that uses the Tai Lue script to document historical and Buddhist narratives, seems to be making a comeback. These movements “allow the Tai Lue diaspora in Laos, Burma and elsewhere to associate themselves with their ancient homeland in Sipsong Panna” (Grabowsky & Techasiriwan 2013: 8).

Yet other scholars such as Benton and Gomez (2014) are cautious about romanticizing diasporic ethnic identities. They note, for example, that Chinese identities among migrants are adopted to the extent that they generate profitable opportunities, especially for entrepreneurial migrants such as the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. At the same time, vis à vis state authorities, transnationalism cannot be assumed to justify unrestricted freedom of movement for all kinds of migrants. Borders are tighter for specific types of migrant workers than they
are for highly skilled professionals. This is certainly the case for many transnational migrant women in Southeast Asia who are beholden to contractual arrangements to undertake domestic work in the region. Their contractual work and inability to secure citizenship in their respective countries of employment limits, not just their career choices, but also their modes of intimacy with their left-behind children whom they cannot bring over to join them in the future (Hoang et al. 2015).

The concept of alternative regionalism in Southeast Asia is revisited in this section, for it is instructive to tease out the different ways in which alternative regionalism has been deployed. Chandra’s (2009) work on ASEAN suggests that transnational civil society actors may be categorized as either mainstream, or progressive, regionalists. The former tend to be supportive of neoliberal policies, while the latter push for more socialistic ideals. The progressive regionalists contest the neoliberal agenda of ASEAN. Their activities are underpinned by a different vision for a region, which studies in alternative regionalism see as a “social construct that is built actively by various agencies rather than being a passive object” (Igarashi 2011: 4). One example is the Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy (SAPA), an international non-governmental organization. In the statement that it submitted to ASEAN as its Charter was being deliberated more than a decade ago, the network articulated its commitment to labour standards, trade unions, and a debt-free region (SAPA 2006). Another example is the networks of non-government organizations and international development agencies working for sustainability and environmental preservation in the region. These advocacies are targeted at unhampered tourism that destroys the region’s ecology. NGOs in mainland Southeast Asia, for example, have worked with local partners for community-based ecotourism. But as Parnwell argues, much work needs to be done “in convincing tourists to act as ethical consumers who can potentially wield immense power over the future direction of sustainable tourism development in Southeast Asia.” (Parnwell 2008: 253)

Alternative regionalism, however, is not always a successful endeavour. Networks can become dormant, as in the case of the People’s Agenda for Alternative Regionalisms (PAAR). This is indicative of the institutional weaknesses of such transnational coalitions. While studies have welcomed their critical contributions in forging regional identities, they also problematize their narratives. Rother (2015), for example, questions their legitimacy because some of these transnational coalitions are also elite-driven. It thus casts a doubt not only on their potential in terms of activism, but more fundamentally, on their status as the “true voice of the people” (Rother 2015: 104).

**Conclusion: WP4 projects on transnationalism and identity**

A key concept in this brief review of literature is alternative regionalism. It reflects Work Package 4’s interest in how alternative regional identities are engendered on the ground. For the most part, however, alternative regionalism has been discussed in relation to organized transnational coalitions. These organizations are crucial in actively defining different visions, or imaginings, about Southeast Asia’s future in relation to the economy, mobility, and labour.
WP 4 researchers intend to pursue an interest in transnationalism and identity in Southeast Asia by paying attention to other non-state actors who may not necessarily be organized as transnational coalitions. But their transnationalism offers ways of reimagining Southeast Asia as a region. Thus, we seek to investigate the role of pilgrimage and other trans-border religious activities. These activities reinforce the religio-ethnic identity of the Tai Lü who inhabit different areas in the Upper Mekong Region (Grabowsky & Dao). A strong sense of identity is also affirmed by different ethnic communities at the borderland such as the Karen, a phenomenon studied by Kwanchewan Buadaeng. For Filipinos who travel around the region, being part of transnational Christian communities is helpful in asserting their social identities in countries where they are a minority. This subject is addressed by Jayeel Cornelio in his research work. Beyond religion, other individual projects look at how migration affects people’s understandings of themselves as Southeast Asians. Ethnic identity, for example, is reinterpreted as Malays migrating from the peninsula to Indonesia in a study by Jan van der Putten and Alan Darmawan. Changing citizenship becomes an option too for some migrants, demonstrating also the fluidity of Southeast Asian identities, as Filomeno Aguilar, Jr seeks to analyse in his research. Finally, attention is also given to organized movements in the region through a project on a transnational coalition of indigenous peoples in ASEAN undertaken by Prasit Leepreecha.

The broad questions we intend to answer through these studies are as follows:
How do the activities of these non-state actors contribute to a rethinking of ethno-religious groups beyond national borders? What issues are at stake for them? What identities are asserted? And how are these identities performed?

4. VIOLENCE
(VOLKER GRABOWSKY)

This section will cover the state of the art concerning violence and its relevance for the formation of identity in Southeast Asia. Violence is understood as “[t]he intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (WHO 2002, 4). The complexity and variety of violent acts calls for an analytical framework or a typology to clarify the common features and linkages between different types of violence. Thus, it makes sense to divide acts of violence into three broad categories, according to their perpetrators. The first category comprises self-directed violence and thus includes suicides; the second category pertains to violence committed by an individual or a small group of individuals against other individuals (including homicide). Finally, the third and last category comprises all acts of collective violence committed by large groups of people such as state security forces, organized political groups, militia and terrorist organizations. This kind of organized violence also includes suicide attack.

Since the research projects in WP4 dealing with violence and identity in a Southeast Asian context cover various forms of collective or mass violence, this section focuses on the
last analytical category, without dismissing the relevance of the first two categories. Collective violence or mass violence “is a collective tactic pursued because it promises to serve a collective purpose” (Boudreau 2010: 141). It occurs at different levels: at a local or regional level in the form of subnational conflicts (e.g. separatist movements); at the level mainly of the nation-state (e.g. civil wars and anti-colonial struggles); and at the transnational level in the form of interstate and international conflicts (e.g. wars between nation-states). The impact of group violence on identity will be discussed at all three levels against the background of the Southeast Asian experience of the last century. Moreover, specific cultural, social, demographic and psychological conditions – either favouring or impairing the outbreak of mass violence – will be addressed. Finally, the question of how violence has shaped social, political, and other forms of identities in Southeast Asia will be taken into consideration.

**Subnational violent conflicts and identity**

The vast majority of violent conflicts in Southeast Asia since World War II have been fought at a subnational level. In many cases these conflicts revolve around demands of ethno-linguistic and religious groups for political autonomy and self-determination within a nation-state. Very often these groups articulate historical claims to justify their cause. In spite of underlying political and economic factors, ethno-religious conflicts occur in cultural contexts deeply embedded in identity issues. Croissant and Trinn (2009) argue that such culturally grounded political conflicts “do not primarily hinge on a clearly definable, interest-based (and thus essentially negotiable) object” which makes them more explosive than other kinds of conflicts. There are, thus, good reasons for assuming a connection between identity and violence. It can be argued that groups based on particularistic – ethnic, religious, racial – identities may be particularly prone to violence since identity groups tend to have primordial ideological foundations containing a powerful exclusionary distinction between themselves and the “others” (Smelser 2007).

A prominent form of subnational violence is a secessionist armed conflict over control of a subnational territory within a sovereign state. Such conflicts have affected half of the current eleven nation-states of Southeast Asia over the last thirty years. Among the countries in the region, Myanmar (Burma) is probably the one most seriously affected by secessionist movements which have been challenging the territorial integrity of the state since its independence from Britain in January 1948. Most of the non-Bamar ethnic groups – making up about one-third of the total population and inhabiting almost two-thirds of the country’s territory – have founded insurgency movements seeking either autonomy, within the Union of Myanmar, or full independence. Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian country divided into “ethnic states”, some of which were given a special status as “protected territories” by the British colonial administration. It is the only country where political conflicts centred on issues of ethno-linguistic, religious, and historical animosities between the country’s ethnic majority (the Bamar), and the minorities has become increasingly violent, especially after the military coup d’état of 1962 (Smith 1999, 2007; South 2008). Following the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of March 2015 and the restoration of parliamentary democracy in the same year, the secessionist
armed conflicts partly subsided, but the level of ongoing warfare in Kachin State is still very high. The same is true for clashes in Shan State and along the border with China (Kokang). A separate issue is the subnational violence in Rakhine State where an ethno-religious conflict bordering the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh simmers on. In spite of the intervention of Burmese military forces and the demands of Rohingya extremists for an autonomous state in Sittwe in northern Rakhine, the main protagonists of the violent conflict seem to be, on the one side, the Rohingya Muslims claiming Rakhine (or a part of the territory) as their ancestral homeland and calling for Burmese citizenship through a claim for ethnic recognition. On the other side can be found the Buddhist (Rakhine-)Burmese majority who argue that the vast majority of Rohingya are illegal settlers the majority of whom migrated from Bangladesh in recent times (see Leider 2013 and 2016). In contrast to the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand and the Moros of Mindanao – who both have strong cases as primordial ethno-religious groups – the claims of the Rohingya to primordial locality in Rakhine appear rather weak (Kosuta 2017: 29). In any case, the Rakhine conflict clearly demonstrates how mutually exclusive historical and cultural claims of identity groups engender violence.

Whereas the Cambodian and Lao nation-states did not experience subnational conflicts that involved ethno-religious groups calling for autonomy or secession — with the Hmong army in Laos during the Second Indochina War being only partially an exception (Lee 1982) – Vietnam faced secessionist conflicts until the 1970s. The Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées (FULRO), founded in 1964, was an organization of ethnic minorities in the Vietnamese central highlands fighting all kinds of Vietnamese hegemony, both that of the pro-Western regime in Saigon and also their Communist adversaries, the Vietcong. The FULRO insurgency finally subsided at the end of the 1980s. But its impact on the politics of ethnic relations was profound and indeed survived the insurgency’s demise: into the twenty-first century, state policies and officials’ decisions on ethnic minorities were shaped by fears of a recrudescence of ethno-nationalist violence. The Khmer minority in the Mekong delta is another group which instigated an insurgency, though at a rather low level, against the Vietnamese state in the decades following the collapse of French rule in 1945. The Khmer Krom argued that at the time when the French established their ruler in Cochinchina (1858–62) Vietnamese suzerainty over various Khmer inhabited provinces of the lower Mekong delta was doubtful (Forest 1980). The communal violence between Khmer Krom villagers and pro-Communist Vietnamese forces reached its peak between 1945 and 1947 when the French colonial authorities were very weak, both politically and militarily. In his study of the role of ethnicity and violence in Khmer-Vietnamese relations, Shawn McHale observes that the high degree of indiscriminate violence by indigenous inhabitants and civilians in Cochinchina, coincided with the breakdown of rural order; thus “[a] wide variety of groups, from brigands to armed political bands, took advantage of the opportunity” (McHale 2013: 380).

Thailand, or Siam as the country was known until 1939, is proud of being the only country in Southeast Asia which escaped colonization by European powers. However, the country's present-day borders are the outcome of unequal treaties which the Siamese kingdom
was forced to conclude with France and Britain. As a result, large territories inhabited by non-Siamese ethnic groups fell under French (Laos) and British (the Malay sultanates of Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah) rule, while significant areas inhabited by the same peoples became part of the modern Thai nation-state, such as the predominantly Lao inhabited Northeast (Isan) and the former Malay sultanate of Patani (now the three southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat). Whereas political regionalism in Isan during the 1940s and 1950s did not develop with armed movements calling for autonomy or even secession from the Thai state (Keyes 1967), the Malay Muslim minority in the deep south — making up a large majority in the region itself — remained resilient. In the 1970s, a Malay nationalist insurgency embarked upon an armed struggle, for some time financially supported by Gaddafi’s Libya, against the representatives of the Bangkok government. Its resurgence since the beginning of the twenty-first century, following two decades of relative peace, gave inter-communal relations in southern Thailand a stronger religious thrust. During the last two or three decades it has led to a radicalization of the Thai-Buddhist minority, increasingly fearful of being marginalized and even threatened in its very identity, as explored by McCargo’s impressive study Mapping National Anxieties (McCargo 2012). In another study the same author challenges widespread notions of Thai Buddhism as a “civic religion” by analysing the growing militarization of the Buddhist Sangha and laity in Thailand’s deep south. (McCargo 2012). A slightly earlier study (Jerryson 2011) reveals the hidden existence of armed Buddhist monks in a highly volatile and contested border region.

In the Philippines, a variety of ethnic groups such as the Tausug, Samal, Maguindanao, Maranao and Iranum in the Southern Archipelago perceived their cultural and linguistic particularities being gradually supplanted by their Muslim identity as they resisted Spanish and American colonialism. This continued in their resistance against the Philippine state, in the post-colonial period. The concept of Bangsa Moro (Moro nation) was also adopted. In the 1970s, a rebellion against the central government, which received ideological support from the Middle East, led to the formation of the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) which had a rather programmatic approach towards Islam. From the 1990s, the influence of veterans from the Afghan jihad against the Russians invasion accelerated the ‘confessionalisation’ of the conflict which became the eastern most example of a Muslim population struggling to establish a form of Islamic governance.

In Indonesia, religious references impregnated movements expressing ethnic and/or regional discontent at the central government. Examples of this evolution include the rebellions led by Darul Islam during the 1950s in regions such as Aceh (Reid 2006) and Sulawesi. Another is PRRI, a rebel movement led by army officers demanding — among other issues — a rebalancing of the relationship between Java and the other islands. The sharp growth of Catholicism in East Timor after its annexation by Indonesia in 1975, is another a permutation of this theme. The cultural and linguistic homogenization that affected Indonesian society over recent decades coincided with the strengthening of increasingly monolithic religious identities (Picard & Madinier 2011). While before the 1960s and 1970s religious practices were strongly
influenced by regional identities, these are now increasingly concerned with religious orthodoxy which ostensibly unites people from different regions within Indonesia, as well as the wider Muslim World.

New insights into our understanding of the dynamics of subnational violence in Southeast Asia has been provided by a recent study of The Asia Foundation that analysed data collected from three violent incidence monitoring systems (VIMS): the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS) in the Philippines, the Deep South Incident Dataset (DSID) in Thailand, and the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) in Indonesia (see Patrick Barron, Anders Engvall & Adrian Morel 2016). The advantage of these three data bases over much larger existing cross-country datasets is the use of local sources (including local newspapers) which allow for a more detailed and accurate reporting of acts of violence. Using the new innovative method of analysing data collected from locally based VIMS. The authors arrive at the conclusion that the subnational conflicts in Aceh, the Bangsamoro, and Thailand’s Deep South are, or have been, much more intense than previously thought. Some cases, in particular the Bangsamoro conflict, show that much of the violence that occurs is not a result of vertical state-periphery relations, but of horizontal tensions between local groups, along with criminal activities (ibid: 61). This important observation needs also to be considered with regard to the analysis of other subnational conflicts in Southeast Asia. Finally, the use of gender-disaggregated victim statistics allows for a clearer understanding of how violence affects men and women differently. While men are more likely to be both the perpetrators – and the victims – of all kinds of violence, except domestic violence, the use of bombs – a preferred tactic employed by insurgents in Southern Thailand – for example, can lead to a higher risk for women to become involved in separatist violence.

**Violent conflicts at the national level and their relation to identity politics**

The characteristics of individual states and the international context have been crucial in the shaping of mass violence in Southeast Asia. Though there is no doubt that the state has been a major player in inter-ethnic violence, it is questionable whether nation-building has to be considered “a form of racism because it involves the construction of a national identity built on the hatred of other”, as argued by Paul (2010: 9) who defines not only nationalism but also patriotism as “violent psychological mechanisms” intended to humiliate the “other”. Less ideologically biased is Robinson (2010b:70) who points out that all states in the region have influenced or even conditioned mass violence in one way or the other; either as perpetrators, as facilitators, or as models of violence. Though the examples highlighted by Robinson exclusively pertain to the modern nation-state, his conceptual framework also seems valid for the colonial or, perhaps, even the pre-colonial state as well. The role of the state as the principal perpetrator of violence is obvious in the mass killings in Indonesia in 1965/66, in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–1978), and in East Timor during the time of Indonesian occupation (1975–1999). These three particular cases of mass killings perpetrated by the state against its own people or certain segments of the population (defined by ethnicity, class, political
affiliation or other criteria) have alone caused the death of several million people and have thus been qualified as “genocide” by many scholars. We also need to refer to the persecution of political opponents in Myanmar by the military following the crackdown of the people’s uprising in August 1988, the nation-wide hunting down of leftist students before and after the military coup d’état of 6 October 1976 in Thailand (see Thongchai 2002; Beemer n.d.), and the repression of “landlords and reactionaries” during the North Vietnamese land reform (1954–1956). Although causing the death of “only” hundreds or thousands of people these further examples indicate that such mass violence at a national level does not necessarily resurface in the absence of a strong state but that it is, on the contrary, more “often the result of strategic calculation by political and military leaders” (Robinson 2010: 76).

Even in cases where the states in Southeast Asia have not been the main perpetrators of mass violence, they have often played a decisive role in instigating, provoking, or facilitating it. In many cases they did so through the vector of identity policies based on a xenophobic mobilization of the population. States have produced and disseminated inflammatory propaganda which was, for example, the root cause of the anti-Vietnamese riots that broke out in Cambodia in the weeks after Lon Nol’s coup d’état of March 1970 with thousands of ethnic Vietnamese murdered during communal riots and more than 200,000 more fleeing to South Vietnam (Kiernan 2008). Or they have mobilized civilian paramilitary groups as happened in Thailand during the short-lived democratic period from 1973–1976 when various right-wing militia like the Nawaphan (New Force) and Krathing Daeng (Red Gaurs) committed acts of violence against members of leftist organizations threatening conservative notions of Thai identity and who were, thus, accused of being “anti-Thai traitors” (Bowie 1997). In a similar vein, when the armed conflict between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea escalated in 1977/78 the Pol Pot leadership accused its opponents of having “Khmer bodies with Vietnamese minds” (Kiernan 1996; Morris 1999).

Moreover, state authorities have facilitated and provoked violence through their engagement with non-state actors committing acts of violence in the face of extreme and unlawful violence of their own security forces. Through such behaviour, states have at least contributed to the spread of violence as a preferred political strategy among non-state groups. The mass killings of members and supporters of the Communist Party of Indonesia in 1965/66, with radical Muslim militias being encouraged by the military, are probably the most striking example of this phenomenon. Most of the violence carried out by military and paramilitary forces of the state in battling Communist insurgents fits into this pattern, too. Half of the countries in Southeast Asia have faced Communist uprisings in the post-World War II period, some were relatively short-lived and at a rather low level, like in Thailand (1965–early 1980s), others inflicted damage over longer periods, such as the Communist insurgencies in Malaysia (before independence), in Myanmar and in the Philippines. In some countries Communist insurgencies succeeded in seizing state power as happened in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1975.

Though less obvious, states in Southeast Asia have also played central roles in the formation and spread of a socio-political culture where political disagreements and conflicts
tend to be resolved through violent means. Through the unparalleled institutional reach of state power, “distinctive forms, repertoires and discourses of violence have been normalized, and have been employed by non-state actors in their own conflicts even where the state has not played a central role” (Robinson 2010b: 77). The dramatic spread of violence perpetrated by local militia groups during the late years of the “New Order” (1966–1998) in Indonesia clearly illustrates this pattern: these groups consciously emulated the style and organization of the Indonesian military and adopted the latter’s violent institutional culture. However, the state is not the only inspirator of violence. One of WP 4’s case studies, involves an examination of an incident of mass violence perpetrated by a hitherto effectively stateless people against the encroaching action of a state.

Wars between states and foreign interventions

Since their independence in the post-World War II years, the nation-states of Southeast Asia have experienced numerous border disputes, many of which resulted from the legacy of the colonial period. Nevertheless, armed conflicts, not to speak of outright wars, between Southeast Asian states remained exceptional. The most serious border conflict was Indonesia’s konfrontasi policy towards Malaysia during the late Suharto period (1963–1966). Claiming the whole of northern Kalimantan, i.e. the sultanates of Sarawak and Sabah as well as Brunei, as Indonesian territory, the Republic of Indonesia questioned the very existence of its northern neighbour. A total of 740 people were killed on both sides and hundreds more wounded in the military clashes ending with a final peace agreement in August 1966. The short Thai-Lao border war (December 1987 – February 1988) over the suzerainty of the village of Ban Romklao and three smaller settlements in the Lao province of Sainyabuli (Xayabouri), claimed by Thailand caused over 1,000 casualties. It ended with the complete withdrawal of the Thai forces from the contested area. In more recent times, the frozen conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the suzerainty of the Preah Vihear temple complex escalated after the main temple was registered as a Cambodian World Heritage site by UNESCO in July 2008. Between October 2008 and May 2011 skirmishes between Thai and Cambodian border troops flared up from time to time in a disputed area surrounding the temple, resulting in dozens of dead and wounded soldiers on both sides and the flight of civilians from the area. Since then the situation has de-escalated, partly owing to mediation efforts by ASEAN, and a full-scale war between Thailand and Cambodia has been averted (see Grabowsky 2017; Strate 2015).

Since 1945, there are only two cases of full-scale wars between Southeast Asian states. One of these cases, the war between Indonesia and East Timor (Timor-Leste) in the aftermath of East Timorese independence, was unilaterally declared on 28 November 1975 by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretelin), one of several contending parties in a civil war that had broken out shortly after the sudden withdrawal of the Portuguese in late 1974, though it could be argued that East Timor at the time was not a sovereign nation-state. Since the opponents of the Marxist oriented Fretelin, in particular the Timorese Democratic Union and the Apodeti Party, called for an Indonesian military intervention and supported the
subsequent integration of East Timor into the Indonesian state, the violent conflict in East Timor might not necessarily be interpreted as a war of aggression by Indonesia against a neighbouring state. The conflict could alternatively be interpreted as either the continuation of an ongoing civil war, or as a subnational war of secession from Indonesia led by a pro-Communist insurgency.

The second case, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia starting on 25 December 1978, was without doubt a full-scale war between two sovereign states in Southeast Asia. Following a year and a half of border skirmishes with Khmer Rouge troops making incursions deep into Vietnamese territory in the strategically important Parrot’s Peak area, thirteen Vietnamese divisions, estimated at 150,000 soldiers well-supported by heavy artillery and air power, occupied the heartland of Cambodia, including the emptied capital of Phnom Penh, within two weeks. This first “Red Brotherhood at War” (Evans & Rowley 1984) entailed the bloody Chinese “punishing campaign” against Vietnam in February and March 1979 leading to an estimated 30,000 casualties on each side. The Cambodian conflict, also called the “Third Indochina War” claimed the lives of more than 15,000 Vietnamese soldiers and of more than 100,000 Cambodian soldiers and civilians.

The Cambodian-Vietnamese war from 1979 until 1989 occurred in the last decade of the global Cold War between the Western world, under US leadership, and the Soviet Union and its allies. This leads to the question of how international actors have influenced the course of mass violence in Southeast Asia by giving covert, or overt, support to the perpetrators of such violence. In some cases international actors – states as well as international institutions – directly intervened militarily. The French and Dutch attempts to reclaim their former colonial possessions respectively in Indochina and Indonesia after the end of World War II are cases in point. The US interventions in Vietnam and Laos from 1964 until 1973 are other well-documented examples of direct military involvement of foreign powers in Southeast Asia leading to tremendous human costs in this Second Indochina War. Apart from 58,220 American casualties, estimates of the total number of military and civilian victims in all three Indochinese countries vary from between 1.5 and 3.5 million people (Hirschman et al. 1995).

Factors facilitating mass violence

In view of the widespread assumption that genocide represents the most despicable kind of mass violence, even worse than a “crime of humanity of extermination”, a number of scholars have proposed widening the UN definition to include the physical and psychological extermination of any organized group of people. Drawing on Card’s concept of “social death” (Cards 2003), Daniel Bultmann proposes to define as genocide the massive rapid and encompassing breakup of the very foundations of a community in which identities have been shaped and articulated in various ways. In such a wider sense, genocide would encompass also politicides, ethnicides, ‘eliticides’ (e.g. the Katyn massacre), and large-scale femicides (Bultmann 2017: 170f.). Genocide in this wider sense would thus comprise such diverse phenomena as the tacit acceptance of millions of victims of starvation in southern Russia and the Ukraine in 1932/33 in the wake of Stalin’s forced collectivization campaign, Mao Zedong’s “Great Leap
Forward” of 1958 which resulted in tens of millions of deaths. It would also encompass the extermination of more than half a million members and supporters, and purported members and supporters, of the Communist Party of Indonesia in 1965/66, the mass deaths of native Americans caused by epidemics imported by European settlers. An even broader definition would encompass also certain forms of slavery, large-scale resettlement schemes of coherent groups, and migration programmes aiming at changing the ethnic and social make-up of a territory, as well as large-scale forced sterilization of women. Such a post-modernist approach to the phenomenon of “genocide”, however, risks devaluing the term, the more so since it is inextricably linked to race and ethnicity (in a wider sense) in almost all languages.

Ben Kiernan’s Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (2007) is one of the most comprehensive comparative studies of genocidal mass violence. Kiernan’s main argument is that genocide as a historical phenomenon that “combined virulent forms of religious sectarianism with territorial expansionism and emergent agrarian and racist thinking” (Kiernan 2007: 604). Though this central assertion seems to be too general, another observation appears more convincing, namely that genocides are not limited to mass killings carried out by state institutions. Genocidal massacres could also be the results of “outbreaks of local communal strife, limited in place and time” (ibid:14), as countless pogroms in Southeast Asia confirm. Kiernan views genocidal massacres as a primordial phenomenon that can be traced back deep into antiquity. As an historian of Cambodia and Southeast Asia, he refers to various examples, ranging from early modern Burma (ethno-religious massacres in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries), Cambodia (anti-Vietnamese massacres in the mid-18th century), up to Indonesia (Sultan Agun’s conquest and repression of major entrepôts along Java’s northern coast in the first half of the sixteenth century) (ibid: 139–161). On the other hand, if the racializing and essentializing discourses of ethnicity as a characteristic feature of modernity, are taken into consideration it is tempting to view genocide as a rather modern phenomenon (Weitz 2003: 18–22).

While mass killings, including the extermination of entire peoples, as well as mass deportations and forced resettlements are not limited only to the modern era (Neimark 2001). However, it is the modern “biopolitical state” (Foucault 1980) that possesses a vastly superior capacity to maximise human resources with projects to eliminate enemies on a large scale, putting the very biological existence of a population at stake. A strong biopolitical state, the modern Leviathan, claims the exclusive right to use physical violence, including the right to kill. In his seminal essay Räume der Gewalt (Spaces of Violence), the German historian Jörg Baberowski (2015), a specialist on Russian and Soviet history, argues that even in the most civilized and technologically advanced societies normal human beings – in other words, everyone who was not an abnormal sadist – were able to become involved in mass killings if encouraged to do so by the highest authorities. This occurs essentially in war time, when the most peaceful of citizens in times of peace, can become executioners knowing, and fearing, that the same acts of violence would be strongly sanctioned by the state. To a certain extent, all forms of modern states, from the most authoritarian dictatorships to liberal democracies, need to discipline
their subjects so that they would internalize the state’s monopoly of biopower. In societies where a culture of obedience is particularly prevalent, mass violence might be instigated by state authorities more easily. Bill Berkeley points out that “[t]he broad participation of tens of thousands of ordinary Hutus undoubtedly was a function of Ruanda’s by now notorious culture of obedience” (Berkeley 2002: 105).

Besides obedience, other characteristics of a culture or society enhance the potential for group violence (Staub 1989). Hierarchy and honour are such characteristic features of Cambodian society which, along with Cambodian cultural models of obedience, facilitated murderous acts, according to Hinton (1998: 117). However, socio-political transformations alone do not entail genocide as the less bloody revolutions in Vietnam and Laos demonstrate. They must be accompanied by a violent ideology which dehumanizes a real, or perceived “enemy”, be he external or internal. This explains why the perpetrators of violence – the executioners of the Cambodian state security services as well as the perpetrators of the Indonesian mass killings of 1965/66 and Thai soldiers shooting at radical students in the compound of Thammasat University in October 1976 – hardly felt any remorse about their deeds. During the political polarization of the 1970s, a right-wing political monk named Kittivudho Bhikkhu even justified the killing of Communist insurgents for the sake of the Thai nation’s survival (Jackson 1989).

A major factor that has facilitated mass violence in Southeast Asia is the participation of youth. The rank and file of the Khmer Rouge were recruited in large numbers from among the poor peasant youth: these indoctrinated and generally fanatical youthful cadres were the most feared by almost everyone during the regime’s reign of terror (Dith Pran, 1997). Many of the most notorious killings in Indonesia during the witch-hunt of Communists were committed by members of Muslim youth organizations. Many other examples from Southeast Asia and elsewhere could be cited to underline the impact of the youth factor. There exists a wide range of literature demonstrating the impact of a “youth bulge”, characterized by a very high percentage of youth especially in the age group between 15 and 24 years. The existence of such a “youth bulge” increases the probability of armed conflicts and mass violence in a society.

The term “youth bulge” was first introduced in academic discourse by the American political scientists Gary Fuller and Jack Goldstone in 1995 and later popularized by the German sociologist and genocide specialist, Gunnar Heinsohn, in his work Söhne und Weltmacht: Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der Nationen (Sons and World Power: Terror in the Rise and Fall of Nations, 2003). Heinsohn argues that an excess of young adult males in the population (notably in cases where the cohort of those aged 15–24 years is higher than 20 percent of the total) leads to social unrest, internal and external armed conflicts, and terrorism. This is especially the case if the “third and fourth sons”, who do not find economic opportunities and prestigious positions in their own societies, rationalize their desire to compete for such opportunities and positions by turning to religion or political ideologies. Heinsohn’s provocative thesis appears highly plausible at least in the light of the Cambodian experience. Cambodia’s “youth bulge” had increased from 17 to over 23 percent between 1962 and 1970 (see Migozzi 1973,
237, 267), with many thousands of high-school students unable to find employment in the state bureaucracy of Prince Sihanouk’s autocratic regime.

**Mass violence and identity**

How is mass violence related to the feeling of belonging on the part of the perpetrators, their victims as well as third parties? Evidence from Southeast Asian suggests that this sense of belonging is shaped by the experience of mass violence. The shared memories of past violence shape ethnic, religious, social, and political identities. Bonds of loyalty are created and deepened through such memories, providing the justification and the models for future mass violence. Those who have experienced violence directly are invariably transformed by it, regardless of whether they are perpetrators, victims or only witnesses of it. This is true in particular for the personal experience of extreme violence, such as beheadings, rape, and torture. It is more this shared experience and collective memory of violence, rather than economic or political grievances, that inspire loyalty and creates group identity. Members of minority groups – Karen, Shan, Kachin, etc. – fighting the Burmese army, Malay Muslims in Thailand’s Deep South, members and supporters of the New People’s Army in the Philippines, all provide evidence of the relationship between mass violence and group identity. In his insightful study of mass violence in East Timor, Douglas Kammen observes that in East Timor and elsewhere the recurrence of violence is of central importance to the narrative of indigenous resistance against colonial oppression, providing the oppressed with a sense of a common destiny – i.e. a sense of belonging – even though the “Timorese peoples were not inherently or culturally predisposed to violence” (Kammen 2015: 168). The role of remembering (and forgetting) of past traumatic violence in the shaping of collective identities has been discussed with regard to the war in Vietnam, for example, by Malarny (2001) and Ring et al. (2017) who ground their analysis in the concept of collective memory as outlined by Halbwachs (1992) and Nora (1996). “Mourning, reparation, and the working-through of violent histories require a relational politics, including a politics of emotion that crosses the divide between victims and perpetrators” (Schwab 2010: 104).

The power of violence to shape identities and to motivate further violence does not function automatically. Local communities, like nations as a whole, may have histories of mass violence or cultural patterns of violent behaviour but then afterwards enjoy longer periods of peace and stability, which one day might be ended by renewed waves of collective violence, as the history of the Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth century has demonstrated. Robinson points at the importance of “violence specialists”, like the notorious preman (thugs for hire) in Indonesia and semi-official militia groups, who consciously encourage acts of mass violence through the evocation, manipulation and even distortion of experiences and memories of past violence. Vincent Boudreau observes that the degree of segregation between populations that movements (political, class, ethnic, religious, generational) attack – and populations from which they recruit – determines the pressure they face to moderate attacks and make them more discriminate. Some theorists have suggested that youth cohorts may develop a
generational consciousness, in particular out of an awareness of belonging to a generation that possesses an extraordinary size and strength thus enabling their members to act as a collective. Urdal (2004: 2) notes, however, that although collective violent action can only be carried out by identity groups but “it is not necessary that identity groups are generation-based for youth bulges to increase the likelihood of armed conflict.”

Violence should not be understood simply by reference to exogenous causes (economic problems, social injustice, foreign intervention, etc.), but rather as a critical element in the process of shaping the identities, motivations, and methods of future violence. Social and political dynamics at a local, national or regional level do not operate independently in the creation of violence, they become pertinent only under certain historical conditions. Smelser (2007: 35f.) identifies four sets of variables explaining the occurrence of violence exercised by identity groups or identity movements (either holding or opposing state power). These variables are a facilitating ideology; opportunities for the use of violence; access to the means of violence; and the actual unavailability of alternative political means to achieve specific ends. It is therefore debatable whether a democratic political environment gives identity groups a greater propensity for a non-violent articulation than authoritarian regimes (Gurr & Half 1994). An effective state is often more important in avoiding or regulating ethnic violence than the form of government as Umar (2007) has suggested in discussing the Nigerian case.

**Conclusion: WP4 projects on violence and identity**

The projects of the WP4 cluster “Violence” study the interrelationship between identity issues and violence in Southeast Asia at various levels. A first study by Victor Grabowsky of mass violence at the national level involves an investigation of the role the Cambodian youth (as spies and informants, as members of the army and as security guards, but also as victims) in the revolutionary terror of the Khmer Rouge regime in the second half of the 1970s. A second project by Janina Pawelz focusing on the national level involves a study of martial arts groups in Timor-Leste which have gained prominence as instigators of violence and actors of insecurity and challenge peace and security in the country. This project analyses youth identities in Timor-Leste through the lens of social identity theory. A violent conflict at the subnational level, but with transnational implications is dealt with in the project by Jacques Leider on ethno-religious entanglements in the Bengal-Myanmar borderlands. This project intends to bridge two lacunae in existing research. On the one hand, it seeks to address the spatial gap in research work on Bangladesh’s Chittagong Division and Myanmar’s Rakhine region. On the other, it tries to overcome the temporal gap between research on the coastal zone (open to circulation under the British colonial regime) and the post-independence narratives that were driven by the development of the nation-states of (East) Pakistan/Bangladesh and Burma/Myanmar. It also includes field-work related to the impact of communal and state violence on the political conscience and identity of women in the Rakhine heartlands and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Finally, a case study of violence by Andrew Hardy at the micro level which took place in the central Vietnamese district of Son Ha (Quang Ngai province) in early 1950 shed light on the
local historical context that led to the killings of ethnic Viet inhabitants by their Hrê neighbours in the space of a few days. Furthermore, this research explores the impact of memory of the event present-day ethnic relations and political culture in the province. The results of all individual four research projects will provide data for a comparative analysis of violence, trauma and identity in Southeast Asia.

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